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ABSTRACT
The popularity of Voice over the Internet Protocol (VoIP) is increasing as the cost
savings and ease of use is realised by a wide range of home and corporate users.
However, the technology is also attractive to criminals. This is because VoIP is a
global telephony service, in which it is difficult to verify the user’s identification.
The security of placing such calls may also be appealing to criminals, as many
implementations use strong encryption to secure both the voice payload as well as
to control messages making monitoring such VoIP calls difficult since
conventional methods such as wire-tapping is not applicable to VoIP calls.
Therefore, other methods of recovering electronic evidence and information from
VoIP are required. This research looks at what protocol evidence remains after a
VoIP call has taken place examining both a virtual hard disk and the Random
Access Memory (RAM).
This paper proposes a set of identifiable credentials based on packet header
information contained within the VoIP protocol stack. A series of controlled tests
were undertaken whereby these credentials were forensically searched for on a
virtual machine which was used to make the VoIP call. This experiment was then
repeated by a search for the same protocol credentials within the RAM.
Keywords: Computer forensics, digital evidence, electronic evidence, Voice over
Internet Protocol, VoIP, memory forensics
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1. INTRODUCTION
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology has radically changed the way
that telephony data is communicated and thus it has begun to revolutionise the
Australian Telecommunications industry. With the tremendous growth in
popularity and broadband access capability to Internet, such technologies have
emerged that allows telephone calls to be routed over Internet infrastructure rather
than the traditional Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) infrastructure.
This technology, called VoIP, uses the Internet Protocol (IP) to route packets
containing small portions of voice conversations between the callers.
The popularity of VoIP is increasing as the cost savings and ease of use is realised
by a wide range of home and corporate users. However, the technology is also
attractive to criminals, especially the non-carrier VoIP. This is because (1) VoIP
is a global telephony service, in which it is difficult to verify the user’s personal
identification (2), the security of placing such calls may also be appealing to
criminals, as many implementations use strong encryption to secure both the
voice payload as well as to control messages, and (3) monitoring or tracing such
VoIP calls is difficult since conventional methods such as wire-tapping is not
applicable to VoIP calls. Therefore, other methods of recovering evidence and
information from voice over IP protocol are required. It is essential that forensic
computing researchers devise methods to allow law enforcement agencies to
overcome some of the aspects of this method of telephony that are advantageous
to criminals.
This introduction provides an overview of the VoIP transport protocols and a
signalling protocol. This establishes the information from which it is possible to
forensically retrieve fields from the protocol headers as well as user registration
information for a VoIP call.
VoIP is not a single protocol in itself but rather a collection of a number of coexisting and competing protocols, which are used for setting up, maintaining and
tearing down calls and protocols for the encapsulation and transportation of
packets over the Internet. This collection of protocols referred to as the protocol
stack contains the Internet Protocol (IP) (Postel, 1981a). The IP is responsible for
providing the internet addresses in its internet header allowing packets to be
routed from their source to a destination IP address. The IP header format is
shown below in Figure1.
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Figure 1 – IP packet header format
A reliable protocol for the transmission of packets across the Internet is the
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) (Postel, 1981b), which guarantees delivery
because both lost and corrupt packets are re-transmitted. However, for real-time
VoIP calls there is no purpose in re-transmitting lost packets. TCP makes use of
flow control, which temporarily suspends the transmission of packets until the
corrupt packet is successfully re-transmitted.
Instead, the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) (Postel, 1980), although a less
reliable protocol since packet delivery is not guaranteed, is more suited to the
requirements of VoIP. The selected system is thus an IP/UDP protocol stack. The
IP datagram provides a source and destination address to identify the sending and
receiving host but further information is required to provide an exact delivery
location. This information is provided by the UDP, which adds the source and
destination port numbers. The combination of an IP address and port number
provides a socket. Common applications are configured to work via specific ports.
The IP/UDP stack and UDP header format is shown below in Figure 2.

Figure 2 – IP/UDP stack showing the UDP packet header format
The reason for choosing UDP over TCP is that UDP does not guarantee delivery
of packets whereas TCP does. TCP guaranteed delivery is achieved by the retransmission of lost or out of sequence packets, which is undesirable for real-time
audio.
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The Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) (Schulzrinne et al, 2003) provides
network transport for real-time applications such as transmitting audio over a
packet switched network. The RTP protocol is chosen for the transmission of
voice data because it adds additional information such as a sequence number to
each packet to provide the application receiving the audio an opportunity to
sequence packets in the correct order within a buffer and also provides a
timestamp for each individual packet which allows playback of the audio at
regular intervals. The protocol stack has now become an IP/UDP/RTP stack. Not
that the use of RTP is not necessary to make and receive VoIP calls, it simply
adds additional data to assist the receiving application with packet order and
playback as well as allowing multiple users to facilitate VoIP conferencing. The
IP/UDP/RTP stack and RTP packet header format is shown below in Figure 3.

Figure 3 – IP/UDP/RTP stack showing the RTP packet header
The sequence numbers and timestamps are unique for each packet. The sequence
numbers are incremented by one for each packet sent allowing the destination to
re-order packets that have arrived out of sequence and detect packet loss. The
timestamp conveys information relating to the sampling of data packets.
The Synchronisation Source (SSRC) field identifies the source of the
synchronization e.g. computer clock whereas the Contributing Source (CSRC)
field identifies the source of the individual contributions that make up the single
data stream payload for the packet. It is not necessary to use the RTP to
participate in a VoIP call. VoIP applications such as Skype (Download, 2009a) do
not make use of the RTP whereas X-Lite (Download, 2009d) does. The
experiments performed within this research were conducted on both applications
Skype and X-Lite but only X-Lite results are discussed since the RTP adds an
extra protocol from which fields from within the protocol header may be searched
for.
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An audio sample is packetised and transported across a network. If the packet is
too large and needs to be fragmented or originated from multiple sources, then
each fragment will have the same CSRC to identify that they have come from the
same data stream but different sequence numbers, allowing them to be reconstructed in the correct sequence whereas different sources will have a unique
CSRC. This is used for synchronization at the destination.
The protocols IP, UDP and RTP are essentially protocols which encapsulate and
transport packet data containing the information necessary to identify the source
and destination of the calling parties and deliver the payload containing the voice
component. The following protocol, the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
(Rosenberg, et al, 2002) is a signalling protocol used to establish, maintain and
tear-down the call when terminated. SIP allows the calling parties called User
Agents (UAs) to locate one another using a network of proxy servers, which
allows UAs to be registered and invite other UAs to join in an Internet multimedia
call called a session, based on HTTP requests/responses. Each transaction consists
of a request that invokes a particular method and at least one response as shown in
Figure 4. Jane uses her VoIP application to send an ‘Invite’ request to Joe. The
‘Invite’ request is a SIP method that specifies the action that Jane wants Joe to
take, accepting the call from Jane. The ‘Invite’ request passes through two proxy
servers to reach Joe, initiating a response from each proxy, (1) – (5). The
destination ‘Ringing’ response from Joe is returned to the sender again passing
through each proxy, (6) – (8). Confirmation of accepting the ‘Invite’ request is
confirmed with an ‘OK’ response from Joe to Jane, (9) – (11). The media session
can start once Jane has acknowledged the ‘OK’ response, (12). The session can be
terminated by either party but is shown to be Joe in this instance, (13) – (14).

Figure 4 – SIP session between two UAs
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As previously discussed, VoIP represents a packet based Internet technology for
voice communication as opposed to traditional telephone calls. This will impact
law enforcement as wire-tapping is no longer valid. A new architecture is required
for the lawful interception of VoIP traffic as varying VoIP applications and
Internet technologies means that IP packets will travel in dissimilar paths making
it difficult to choose an intercept point (Karpagavinayagam et al, 2007).
Possible interception entities can be divided into two areas, those belonging to the
Internet Service Provider (ISP) and those belonging to the Law Enforcement
Agency (LEA), which may be located within the ISP or external to it. Entities
related to the ISP include signalling, the setup, maintaining and tearing down of
IP calls. The data entity is responsible for collecting the IP voice traffic which
may be implemented on the same sub-network as the VoIP gateway, which
connects to your existing telephone line. Entities related to the LEA may exist
within the ISP architecture but remain under the control of the LEA, otherwise the
gathered information requires authorisation from the ISP for access and
decryption keys.
There is no single entity that VoIP traffic may be intercepted, however, the more
central the components are on the signalling path makes lawful interception of
VoIP more easy to perform (Seedorf 2008). Unfortunately, VoIP is characterised
by a high degree of decentralisation, especially for mobile users connecting to the
Internet for short periods of time. This may result in a move from nodes in a
network under the authority of Law Enforcement Agencies to a situation where
lawful interception is performed by requests to the Internet operators. For
example, Skype uses proprietary encryption as opposed to published standards,
DES (Data Encryption Standard) and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). This
requires LEAs to approach Skype for the encryption keys if they require captured
VoIP traffic to be decrypted.
The VoIP application Skype is popular, but also the subject of numerous network
forensics investigations because of its ability to traverse network address
translation and bypass firewalls (Leung and Chan, 2009). Any Skype client, an
individual with the Skype application deployed on their computer system for the
purpose of making VoIP calls, may unwillingly become a super node on the
Skype communication path maintain the Skype overlaying network, which may
pose considerable risk to corporate businesses. Only by analysing Skype traffic,
its communication network will it become possible to detect Skype UDP sockets.
This will allow the blocking of Skype traffic.
Several models currently exist for investigation in digital forensics but the
framework from the Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) provides
sequential steps for digital forensic analysis. These steps are shown below:
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Identifcation



Preservattion



Collection



Examination



Analysis



Presentation

The examination and analysis of captured memory is performed in a read-only
fashion, which leaves the original information un-altered.
As well as capturing the VoIP data, protocols, call configuration, raw packets
with payloads, network forensic patterns (Pelaez and Fernandez, 2009) may be
used to collect details about the VoIP user’s activities from monitoring
components in the network architecture such as incoming and outgoing numbers,
geographical location, call duration with start and end times. A forensic pattern, a
systematic approach to the forensic collection and analysis of data may allow for
real-time analysis of VoIP captured traffic.
In previous work (Simon and Slay, 2006; Slay and Simon , 2008; Simon and Slay
2009), memory forensics have been carried out on computers (on various
platforms) to extract VoIP transactions. This is a move away from VoIP network
forensics to looking at specific memory storage areas within a computer to
discover what artefacts of the VoIP call remain after the call has been terminated.
It should be noted that it is not the purpose of this paper to provide a framework
for digital forensic collection but rather demonstrate through experimentation that
more information may be gathered from the contents of RAM as opposed to hard
disk storage media for digital artefacts left behind after a VoIP call. As the cost of
hard disk storage reduces, it allows larger sizes of physical memory storage
shipped with computer systems. The increase in the size of RAM is not so
prevalent, allowing RAM to be searched much faster, gigabytes of RAM as
opposed to terabytes of hard disks. The seizure of RAM contents may be
accomplished by the seizure of a computer system that is still powered on or
covertly over the Internet without the user’s knowledge.
2. EXPERIMENT 1
The recovery and analysis of digital forensic evidence from a computer
forensic examination is well documented and rigorously implemented in order
to prevent ambiguous interpretation of results within a court of law. This area
of memory forensics can be used to recover documents, images and emails
from a target computer system.
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However, there is little research in the area of VoIP forensics, the art of
applying memory forensic techniques to identify VoIP packets that remain on a
computer system after a VoIP call. The proposed research builds upon the
previous work (Simon and Slay, 2006; Slay and Simon , 2008) of the Defence
and Systems Institute (DASI) at the University of South Australia. The
experimental setup is shown below in Figure 5.

Figure 5 – VoIP call and packet detection setup
The experimental setup involved making a single VoIP call between two
computers using Windows Operating System (OS) within a virtual machine
(Download, 2009b). Each virtual machine was cloned from a virtual hard disk
with a fresh install of Windows OS. The use of virtualisation creates a contained
environment into which the X-Lite VoIP application is installed. X-Lite makes
use of the SIP protocol, thus requiring a user to first register their details with a
SIP server to initiate a VoIP call.
Once the call is initiated, both users may communicate with each other until one
party terminates the call. Once the call is terminated the virtual machine is shut
down at endpoint B and the virtual hard disk is analysed using X-Ways
(Download, 2009e) forensic software.
The purpose of the packet sniffer is to monitor and collect the packets being
transferred between both endpoints capturing the protocols and the payload as
they pass from the source of the call to its destination and responses from the
destination to the source. The packet sniffer used was Wireshark (Download,
2009c).
2.1 Target Artefacts
The target artefacts are based on protocol fields captured using Wireshark as well

22

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(1)
as signalling information as shown in Figure 6.

Session Initiation Protocol:
‐ Request-Line:
‐ Invite sip:8889215862@sip.pennytel.com
Method: Invite
‐ Message Header
Contact:sip:8889215864@119.40.108.72:26610
‐ To: “david”< sip:8889215862@sip.pennytel.com>
SIP Display info: “david”
‐ SIP to address:sip:8889215862@sip.pennytel.com
SIP to address User Part: 8889215862
SIP to address Host Part: sip.pennytel.com
‐ From:“8889215864”sip:8889215864@sip.pennytel.com

Figure 6 – SIP Invite request
Before a SIP call can be made, individuals or organisations are required to register
with a SIP registration server, and are issued with a unique SIP address, which
takes the form of users@hosts, where the user portion can be a name or telephone
number and the host portion can be a domain name or network address, for
example, 8889215862@sip.pennytel.com. The user part 8889215862 uniquely
identifies the user agent and the host part identifies pennytel.com as the SIP
service provider. This is performed using the SIP ‘Register’ request. Once
registered, user agents can communicate with each other with the assistance of
proxy servers, which can forward requests and responses to another proxy which
is located closer to the actual end user agent.

Target artefacts based on SIP signalling protocol are:
user Ids 889215862 & 8889215864
host, pennytel.com (SIP service provider)
SIP server IP address
Call-ID

Figure 7 – Target SIP artefacts
Once the VoIP call was initiated, the audio file English.wav lasting 24 seconds
was replayed in succession 5 times. The file English.wav consists of spoken
power words "welcome, peace, love, joy, hope, compassion, mystery, unity,
equality, creativity, freedom, health, spirit, inspiration, release".
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The following protocol information captured from frame 797 of the VoIP call
using Wireshark is shown below in figure 8. This information is used to form a
byte search pattern for a manual search of the virtual hard disk using X-Ways.
Frame 797 (134 bytes on wire, 134 bytes captured)
Frame Number: 797
Frame Length: 134 bytes
Protocols in frame: eth:ip:udp:rtp
Ethernet Protocol:
Destination: Vmware_c1:09:d9 (00:0c:29:c1:09:d9)
Source: IntelCor_4a:d6:26 (00:21:6a:4a:d6:26)
Internet Protocol:
Source: 192.168.0.102
Destination: 192.168.0.105
Real-Time Transport Protocol:
Synchronisation Source ID: 0xf1fa6792 (4059719570)

Figure 8 – Wireshark capture of frame 797
The Ethernet Protocol (Hornig, 1984) provides the physical Ethernet Hardware
Address (EHA) more commonly referred to as the Media Access Control (MAC)
address which is a unique identifier assigned by the manufacturer of the Network
Interface Card (NIC). This enables X-Ways to search for the 6 byte source/
destination MAC address, the 4 byte source/destination IP address and the 4 byte
SSRC captured by Wireshark as artefacts left behind as evidence of a VoIP call.
2.2 Data Analysis and Results
Data analysis was performed using X-ways forensic software to view the virtual
hard disk within which the VoIP call took place. The virtual hard disk was not
imaged or copied in any way, but rather viewed in read-only mode from its
original location.
Table 1 below shows the artefact results from performing a manual search and the
number of hits.
Table 1 – Search for signalling protocol artefacts
Target – SIP signaling

Hits

192.168.0.102

0

192.168.0.105

0

8889215862

0

8889215864

0

Pennytel.com

0

Call-id

0
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The entire duration of the VoIP call was 183 seconds, consisting of 17,704
frames, of which only 11 frames were related to the SIP at the start of the call
(Invite – Trying – Ringing – Ack – Ok request/responses) and end of the call (Bye
– Ok request/response). The remaining 17,693 frames were RTP. The search for
packet header artefacts is shown below in Table 2.
Table 2 – Search for packet header artefacts
Target – Eth/IP/UDP/RTP

Hits

0x 00 21 6a 4a d6 26 (eth MAC src)

0

0x 00 0c 29 c1 09 d9 (eth MAC dst)

18

0x c0 a8 00 66 (IP src 192.168.0.102)

1

0x c0 a8 00 69 (IP dst 192.168.0.105)

3

0x f1 fa 67 92 (RTP SSRC src)

0

0x 22 14 ad 31 (RTP SSRC dst)

0

The VoIP call was received by the X-Lite application within the virtual
environment. The 18 hits for the virtual machine MAC address were related to the
installation of the X-Lite application within the virtual environment and not from
the VoIP call. The hits for the source and destination IP addresses were not within
any meaningful context i.e. a statistically occurring random hit for that 4 byte hex
pattern. The search analysis shows that there are no artefacts remaining from the
SIP signalling protocol or packet header information.
One may assume that the packet header information is only required to ensure that
the payload reaches its destination, the virtual machine and is discarded as it is no
longer required. The remaining encrypted payload will be utilised by the X-Lite
application. Therefore an additional search can be performed for the encrypted
payload. Subsequently, we have the original unencrypted source of the payload,
English.wav, making it possible to also search for the decrypted payload at the
destination virtual machine.
Is it logical to assume that if the virtual machine exchanges in excess of 17,000
RTP frames during the VoIP call that the latter frames are more likely to persist in
memory? Table 3 below shows the search analysis for encrypted payload for
latter occurring frames during the VoIP call.
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Table 3 – Search for encrypted VoIP payload
Encrypted payload for Frame

Hit

17,704

No

17,600

No

17,400

No

17,200

No

17,000

No

16,500

No

16,000

No

15,000

No

14,000

No

A search for the content of the sound file English.wav also resulted in no hits.
This may be due to the fact that the sound file is also contaminated with
background noise when it is digitised by the VoIP application, altering its original
byte content.
2.3 Conclusion: Experiment 1
The purpose of this research was to find digital evidence left behind in memory
after a VoIP call had been received within a virtual environment. The resulting
forensic analysis of the virtual hard disk using X-Ways has yielded no indication
of packet header information from the VoIP transport protocols or the SIP
signalling protocol artefacts persisting in memory once the call has been
terminated.
This initial research has resulted in a change in direction from performing search
analysis in physical memory (such as hard disks) to investigating the digital
artefacts which temporarily exist in RAM.
If packet header information from the transport protocols can be recovered,
including such fields as sequence numbers and timestamps, then this will allow
partial reconstruction of the encrypted VoIP payload. However an additional
question that arises is, ‘Does both the encrypted payload and decrypted payload
persist in RAM at the same time, thus allowing reconstruction of the audible VoIP
call?’, allowing for enough frames to exist in order to make human sense of the
reconstruction.
Previously, 183 seconds of voice required in excess of 17,000 frames. Assuming a
minimum of 20 seconds of voice in order to make sense of the communication,
this would require the reconstruction of almost 2000 frames.
3. RANDOM ACCESS MEMORY
The previous research, the search for digital artefacts, digital evidence that
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persists in memory after the completion of a VoIP call within a virtual
environment based on VoIP protocol information provided no evidence of the call
having taken place. This situation can be overcome in different ways as outlined
below.
3.1 Lawful Interception
Lawful interception has existed since the dawn of the PSTN. Wire tapping, as it is
traditionally known, was an easy task to perform on analogue telecommunications
devices. However, the interception of traffic across the Internet (ETSI, 2001) is
substantially more difficult as Internet traffic may cross geographical boundaries
where no Law exists to allow legal interception of IP based traffic. The Internet
provider may provide no means for lawful interception within their network,
either due to lack of physical means or the right of privacy to its customers.
If a physical location within a network is chosen as the intercept point, then all
traffic may be captured and not just traffic between the target machines. How
does the Internet provider guarantee that non-targeted customers’ information is
not being intercepted even by Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs).
3.2 Live Forensic Analysis
The distinction between live and post forensics is the nature in which digital
evidence is recovered. Live forensics infers that the target machine is in use at the
time potential evidence is collected. This would be a covert action, performed
without the knowledge of the user. This in itself raises a number of questions:
1. The legality of using of spyware which resides within a target machine,
await the initiation of a VoIP call and perform a RAM capture?
2. How is the spyware deployed?
3. Does the spyware search the RAM contents and recovers the information
it requires, packet header information from the VoIP transmission
protocols, user identification used to log into the VoIP application or
signalling protocol information, such as SIP service provide registration
details?
4. Or is the entire RAM contents processed on another machine which
would require the RAM contents to be transmitted across the Internet?
5. Would the user of the target machine notice degradation in processor
capability, an increase in memory use or an increase in broadband
upload?
These are important considerations when constructing spyware but first the actual
digital evidence which may be recovered from a RAM capture must be identified
to determine the feasibility of injecting spyware onto a target machine.
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3.3 Experiment 2
The RAM experimental setup differs from the previous setup in that virtualisation
is no longer used. Previously VoIP calls were made within a virtual environment
and the virtual hard disk searched for digital artefacts persisting in memory. RAM
analysis is more complicated, in that, to perform a RAM capture, the X-Ways
forensic analysis software would have to be deployed within the virtual
environment.
Also the physical amount of RAM available for capture would be less than the
system RAM which is hosting the virtual machine. Instead the RAM capture is
performed on the system RAM of the endpoint machine. The experimental setup
involved making a single VoIP call between two computers using Windows OS.
Two VoIP applications were used, Skype and X-Lite for making the VoIP call at
separate times.
Once the VoIP call is initiated, both users may communicate with each other until
the call is terminated. During the call X-Ways RAM editor is used to expose the
system RAM, and a copy of the RAM contents is saved to a file. This file can
then be manually searched using the X-Ways search function for target artefacts.
Once the call is terminated and the search analysis of the RAM captured file is
complete, the endpoint machine is shutdown to allow the contents of the RAM to
dissipate. The contents of RAM are not permanent and will slowly disappear over
time as the voltage supply decays to the cells holding the binary information
(zeros and ones). After a significant amount of time the endpoint machine is restarted and the process is repeated using a different VoIP application.
3.4 Target Artefacts
The target artefacts are the same for experiment 1, again based on protocol fields
captured using Wireshark as well as signalling information. Once the VoIP call
was initiated, the audio file Highway Blues.wma lasting 93 seconds was replayed
in succession twice. This file was chosen because of its longer duration compared
to the previous audio file English.wav.
The following protocol information captured from frame 753 of the VoIP call
using Wireshark is shown below. This information is used to form a byte search
pattern for a manual search of the RAM file produced by X-Ways as shown in
Figure 9 below.
Frame 753 (214 bytes on wire, 214 bytes captured)
Frame Number: 753
Frame Length: 214 bytes
Protocols in frame: eth:ip:udp:rtp
Ethernet Protocol:
Source: Dell_a2:dd:cb (00:24:e8:a2:dd:cb)
Destination: IntelCor_4a:d6:26 (00:21:6a:4a:d6:26)
Internet Protocol:
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Source: 192.168.0.102
Destination: 192.168.0.100
Real-Time Transport Protocol:
Synchronisation Source ID: 0x542ec3f5 (1412350965)

Figure 9 – Wireshark capture of frame 753
This enables X-Ways to search for the 6 byte source/destination MAC address,
the 4 byte source/destination IP address and the 4 byte SSRC captured by
Wireshark as artefacts left behind as evidence of a VoIP call.
3.5 Data Analysis and Results
Data analysis was performed using X-ways forensic software to view the RAM in
editor mode allowing textual and hexadecimal searches to be performed. In
addition, packet reconstruction software (Simon, 2008) was also used to identify
packet information from the RAM captured file. This software retrieves all
protocols involved in a VoIP call and displays them in a format that allows
Wireshark to display the retrieved packets.
Table 4 below shows the protocol information recovered by the packet
reconstruction software.
Table 4 – VoIP protocols recovered from software
Protocol

Hits

SIP

3

ETH/IP/UDP/RTP

454

Analysis of the RAM capture file with the packet reconstruction software
recovered 454 packets. The recovered packets are not in sequence order. They are
in the order they were recovered from the RAM file. This is correct, as in reality,
pages of memory in RAM would not be sequential as objects and processes may
be moved in and out of RAM as they are required. Table 5 below shows the XWays search for digital artefacts.
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Table 5 – Search for packet header artefacts
Target – SIP/Eth/IP/UDP/RTP

Hits

8889215862 (SIP user)

280

8889215864 (SIP user)

149

Pennytel (SIP host)

921

119.40.108.72 (Server IP address)

81

SIP Call-ID (MGFKNjg…)

24

0x 00 24 e8 a2 dd cb (eth MAC src)

2402

0x 00 21 6a 4a d6 26 (eth MAC dst)

1487

0x c0 a8 00 66 (IP src 192.168.0.102)

1613

0x c0 a8 00 64 (IP dst 192.168.0.100)

3112

0x e4 bd 7b 03 (RTP SSRC src)

744

0x 54 2e c3 f5 (RTP SSRC dst)

48

The size of the RAM captured file was 3,620,888 KB. The most accurate
identification for the existence of digital artefacts is the RTP synchronisation
source identifier, in total 792 (744 + 48) packets were detected. This is
considerably more that that detected by the packet reconstruction prototype
software which still requires fine tuning. Alternatively, the 792 RTP packets may
be fragmented, just partial packets containing the correct SSRC but missing
information. The packet reconstruction software detected 454 full packets which
could be viewed extensively in Wireshark.
It would be a worthwhile exercise to examine closely the packets reconstructed by
the software. To sequence them by their respective RTP sequence number to find
several consecutive frames then search for them using X-Ways to determine their
physical location in RAM. Are they also consecutive or appear to be random?
This is shown below in Table 6.
Table 6 – Byte offset for packets located in RAM
IP Seq.
No.

RTP
Timestamp

RAM Offset
(bytes)

60514

0x 00 31 d9 cc

0160378936

Difference
(bytes)

60515

0x 00 31 da 6c

0160370744

8192

60516

0x 00 31 db 0c

0160362552

8192

60517

0x 00 31 db ac

0160346168

16384

60518

0x 00 31 dc 4c

0160329784

16384
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Although each packet is only 214 bytes in size, consecutive packets appear to be
separated by a multiple of 8192 bytes (8KB). This may be related to the size of
the page files in memory.
3.6 Conclusion: Experiment 2
The purpose of this research was to find digital evidence left behind in RAM after
a VoIP call had been received between two SIP endpoint machines.
The resulting forensic analysis of RAM captured using X-Ways provided an
abundance of digital artefacts from Ethernet and IP addresses, IP sequence
numbers, RTP timestamps and SSRCs, all part of the VoIP transmission protocol
packet header information, Also recovered was SIP signalling information
identifying users, SIP provider(s) and SIP server IP address and call-ID(s).
In addition, the use of packet reconstruction software applied to the RAM
captured file also extracted a large number of packets.
4. PARADIGM SHIFT – HARD DISK TO RAM FORENSICS
The simplified experiments discussed previously provided an insight not
previously investigated, the contents of RAM for VoIP artefacts left behind after a
VoIP call. To investigate this further, the following experiments provide a
definitive analysis of RAM captures for both X-Lite and Skype calls using packet
searching software.
4.1 Skype and X-Lite Call Analysis
The following results are the analysis of a 4.0GB RAM capture performed after a
single Skype call lasting 3 minutes on a laptop. The laptop was the powered down
to allow the RAM contents to dissipate. A second RAM capture was performed
the following day after 3 successive X-Lite calls, the first lasting 30 seconds, the
second lasting 30 seconds and the third lasting 3 minutes. The remnants of calls
that can be recovered in the RAM capture are compared against the Wireshark
capture of the VoIP calls to identify the number of packets recovered versus
packets from the VoIP call. The analysis is shown below in table 7.
Table 7 – Skype and X-Lite call analysis
VoIP
Application

Call
durataion

Packet count
RAM packets
from Wireshark recovered
(total)

RAM packets
recovered
(unique)

% of call
recovered

Skype

180 seconds

18,701

41,959

18,208

97.4%

X-Lite

30 seconds

3,097

4,759

3,093

99.9%

X-Lite

30 seconds

3,290

5,488

3,274

99.5%

X-Lite

180 seconds

9,089

17,695

9,063

99.7%
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Note that the total amount of packets recovered from the RAM capture exceeds
the original number of packets in the call. It was found that in some instances,
packets existed in up to 6 different memory locations in RAM. These were
filtered out to examine the number of unique packets recovered. Figure 6 is used
to demonstrate how multiple X-Lite calls are separated from each other within a
single RAM capture by observing the SSID (synchronisation source ID), unique
to each call stream within the call.

Figure 6 – X-Lite packet analysis
4.2 X-Lite Call Registration and Setup
The X-Lite VoIP application is chosen for detailed analysis of call registration
and setup because this information is unencrypted and transported in packets in
plain text. The X-Lite call id is a lengthy and unique character string.
A search of the RAM capture using X-Ways forensic tool for the SIP registration
call id, OTCWOTjimzI2OTK0NZRimGR4NJQ4ZDY1ZGE5Y2Q0ODC yields
the X-Lite subscribe request for SIP pennytel identification 8889215864
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(username). Each X-Lite call has a different call id for its setup, allowing each call
id to be searched for and subsequently found in the RAM capture, for example the
call 1 setup exchange captured by Wireshark is shown below in Figure 7.
Invite request SIP/SDP 8889215862 (number being called)
Invite request SIP/SDP
100 Trying
401
401 Unauthorized
Ack
401 unauthorized
Ack request
SIP/SDP Invite
SIP/SDP Invite
SIP/SDP Invite
100 Trying
180 Ringing

Figure 7 – X-Lite control signal during call setup
Searching for call 1 id MjQ3ZGM2MDA3ZDI3NjI2yZNiMzcIYTM3NWE5MTQONTE
using X-ways discovered more than 80 occurrences of the call id in the RAM
capture, including Invite requests, Ack and also Bye, which identifies the call is
terminated, ‘user hung up’. Armed with this information allows Law Enforcement
to approach the identified SIP registrar, in this case pennytel, with the call id and
the recovered sequence of packets for the X-Lite call with a request for the packet
contents to be decrypted. It is not the purpose of this research to attempt packet
payload decryption.
5. FUTURE WORK
The lack of VoIP protocol artefacts left behind on a virtual hard disk after a VoIP
call resulted in a shift from disk forensics to RAM forensics. RAM forensics has
successfully demonstrated the ability to recover VoIP protocol artefacts left
behind in RAM after a VoIP call has taken place.
This research is initially motivated to recover packet sequence information to
allow VoIP payloads to be reconstructed correctly. However continuing upon this
will be the identification of the end-user(s), using a track and trace capability. If a
user wishes to remain anonymous, they will most likely spoof IP and MAC
addresses or be hidden behind firewalls.
The immediate foreseeable research is:


The further development of a software tool to recover packet
information in sequence and extract the encrypted payload



identify the VoIP application from signalling and call setup packets
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perform a track and trace of VoIP end-users



understand the paging of virtual memory in RAM to identify and
recover the decrypted audio component
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